Open AccessThe second analogy and the kantian answer to Hume: why “cause” has to be an a priori concept
Author(s) -
Andréa Faggion
Publication year - 2012
Publication title -
revista de filosofia
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.1
H-Index - 2
eISSN - 1980-5934
pISSN - 0104-4443
DOI - 10.7213/revistadefilosofiaaurora.6153
Subject(s) - analogy , philosophy , epistemology , a priori and a posteriori , event (particle physics) , argument (complex analysis) , interpretation (philosophy) , physics , chemistry , quantum mechanics , linguistics , biochemistry
The main goal of Kant’s Second Analogy of Experience was to answer Humean objectionsconcerning the aprioricity of the principle of “every-event-some-cause”. This paper intendsto suggest an interpretation of the Kantian argument that, even though cannot show thatHume should be satisfied with the answer, makes clear Kant’s reasons for that anti-Humeangoal. In the first part of this paper, I intend to discuss summarily Hume’s objection againstthe possibility of a demonstration of the principle “every-event-some-cause” and his thesisconcerning its validity. In the second part, it is the turn of the Kantian answer to thesame question concerning the validity of the principle of “every-event-some-cause”.