
Meaningful and Meaningless Solutions for Cooperative N-person Games
Author(s) -
Aleksandar Pekeč
Publication year - 1996
Publication title -
brics report series
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 1601-5355
pISSN - 0909-0878
DOI - 10.7146/brics.v3i47.20049
Subject(s) - falsity , statement (logic) , mathematical economics , core (optical fiber) , shapley value , measure (data warehouse) , combinatorics , mathematics , point (geometry) , game theory , value (mathematics) , computer science , statistics , linguistics , telecommunications , philosophy , geometry , database
Game values often represent data that can be measured in more than one acceptable way (e.g. monetary amounts). We point out that in such a case a statement about cooperative n-person game model might be "meaningless" in the sense that its truth or falsity depends on the choice of an acceptable way to measure game values. In particular we analyze statements about solution concepts such as the core, stable sets, the nucleolus, the Shapley value (and its generalizations). Keywords: Cooperative n-person Games, Measurement, Sensitivity Analysis.