
Player Aggregation in Noncooperative Games, II
Author(s) -
A.J. Goldman
Publication year - 1981
Publication title -
journal of research of the national bureau of standards
Language(s) - Uncategorized
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 2376-5259
pISSN - 0160-1741
DOI - 10.6028/jres.086.017
Subject(s) - generality , mathematical economics , aggregate (composite) , set (abstract data type) , computer science , mathematics , economics , nanotechnology , materials science , management , programming language
Conditions are given under which subsets of the players of a noncooperative game can be combined into "aggregate players" without changing the set of equilibrium-point solutions of the game. These conditions are shown to be the weakest possible ones with a certain specified kind of generality. "Approximate" versions of the results are also formulated and proven.