Open AccessPlayer aggregation in noncooperative Games
Author(s) -
A. J. Goldman,
Douglas R. Shier
Publication year - 1980
Publication title -
journal of research of the national bureau of standards
Language(s) - Uncategorized
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 2376-5259
pISSN - 0160-1741
DOI - 10.6028/jres.085.023
Subject(s) - aggregate (composite) , mathematical economics , stochastic game , set (abstract data type) , repeated game , strategy , bayesian game , sequential game , computer science , mathematics , game theory , materials science , composite material , programming language
A condition is given, under which subsets of the players of a noncooperative game can be combined into "aggregate players" without changing the set of equilibrium-point solutions of the game. The condition is that an individual player's payoff does not depend on the strategy choices of the other players forming the same aggregate player. "Approximate" versions of this result are also formulated and proven.