Open AccessA Non-puzzle about Assertion and Truth
Author(s) -
John Turri
Publication year - 2020
Publication title -
logos and episteme
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.334
H-Index - 5
eISSN - 2069-3052
pISSN - 2069-0533
DOI - 10.5840/logos-episteme202011435
Subject(s) - assertion , norm (philosophy) , epistemology , key (lock) , philosophy , linguistics , computer science , programming language , computer security
It was recently argued that non-factive accounts of assertoric norms gain an advantage from “a puzzle about assertion and truth.” In this paper, I show that this is a puzzle in name only. The puzzle is based on allegedly inconsistent linguistic data that are not actually inconsistent. The demonstration’s key points are that something can be (a) improper yet permissible, and (b) reproachable yet un-reproached. Assertion still has a factive norm.