Moral Assessments and Legal Categories

In this chapter, I examine the discussion around the rational and moral basis for legal categories in postclassical Imāmī Twelver Shīʿī legal theory. The debate was pushed forward by the Akhbārī movement in the 17th century CE; they proposed a novel position concerning the rational basis for the law in which reason can determine certain moral aspects of an action (e.g., a good action can be recognised by reason, and its performance attracts praise), but not legal elements (e.g., that the performance of a good action deserves a reward beyond praise). This leaves, for them, the Lawgiver (that is, God) to connect the moral aspects of an act with its legal consequences (that is punishment for a morally bad action and reward for a morally good action); that causal connection cannot be made by reason alone. Based on these findings, I conclude that Akhbārī moral theory, often read along literalist lines, showcases an adherence to the Muʿtazilī-derived framework common to the Imāmī Twelver Shīʿī theology and law generally, whilst also reserving ultimate legal authority to God.