Open AccessStrategy and Aspects of Monitoring / Control Strictly in Coordinated Subsystems
Author(s) -
William José Borges,
José Paulo de Souza
Publication year - 2012
Publication title -
revista ibero-americana de estratégia
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
ISSN - 2176-0756
DOI - 10.5585/ijsm.v11i1.1781
Subject(s) - coase theorem , nexus (standard) , extension (predicate logic) , transaction cost , control (management) , business , perspective (graphical) , industrial organization , asset (computer security) , dual (grammatical number) , microeconomics , database transaction , economics , computer science , management , computer security , art , literature , artificial intelligence , embedded system , programming language
This paper aims to discuss the approach structures of the strictly coordinated theoretical framework developed by Zylbersztajn and Farina (1999) as an expanded perspective of the firm, taking into account the food supply chains as an extension of the nexus of contracts proposed by Coase (1937) and taken up by Williamson (1985). The structures stand out as strictly coordinated. Zylbersztajn and Farina (1999) turn to identifying points of common interests that encourage firms to promote contracts between themselves in a strictly coordinated way, considering the degree of asset specificity involved in the transaction and the competitive forces that determine the search for strategic positioning organizations to achieve sustainable superior results.