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Do Monetary Policy Transparency, Independence and Credibility Enhance Macro-Financial Stability?
Author(s) -
Eleftherios Spyromitros,
Sukriye Tuysuz
Publication year - 2012
Publication title -
international journal of economics and finance
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 1916-9728
pISSN - 1916-971X
DOI - 10.5539/ijef.v4n4p44
Subject(s) - transparency (behavior) , credibility , monetary policy , monetary economics , independence (probability theory) , central bank , economics , inflation (cosmology) , government bond , inflation targeting , bond , interest rate , panel data , financial system , finance , econometrics , political science , statistics , physics , mathematics , theoretical physics , law

This paper, using panel data approach, evaluates the effect of, respectively, the central bank transparency, independence and credibility on, respectively, the level and variability of realized and expected economic performance. It also analyzes the effects of central banks characteristics on the level and variability of Government bond rate. The results obtained suggest that central bank independence does not influence the realized and expected level and variability of economic performance. As for the central bank transparency, our findings are consistent with the view that greater transparency could have a desirable reputational effect that lowers inflation expectations and long-term nominal interest rates. Finally, our results show that central bank credibility negatively influences the level and variability of Government bond rate.

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