Open AccessThe Unique Characterization of the Shapley Value for Bi-cooperative Games
Author(s) -
Meirong Wu,
Wenbo Wang
Publication year - 2022
Publication title -
bcp business and management
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
ISSN - 2692-6156
DOI - 10.54691/bcpbm.v18i.589
Subject(s) - shapley value , axiom , characterization (materials science) , mathematical economics , mathematics , urelement , axiom of choice , computer science , set (abstract data type) , game theory , set theory , materials science , geometry , nanotechnology , programming language
The aim of the present paper is to study the unique characterization for bicooperative games. Shapley value is the expected marginal contribution of the alliance. We will introduce some properties for bicooperative games. Our first characterization is based on the classical axioms determining the Shapley value with the symmetry axiom replaced excluded null axiom. In our second axiomatization we use structural axiom and a zero excluded axiom instead of effective axiom in classical cooperative games. Finally, We provide here linearity, anonymity, dummy and efficiency and structural axioms to study a one-point solution concept for Bi-cooperative games.