Open AccessCentralization vs. Bundling: The Victory of an Italian David against an Italian Goliath
Author(s) -
Gustavo Piga
Publication year - 2018
Publication title -
european journal of public procurement markets
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
ISSN - 2184-3813
DOI - 10.54611/vvyo2710
Subject(s) - call for bids , victory , temptation , procurement , complaint , purchasing , limiting , business , clientelism , annulment , marketing , economics , political science , law , mechanical engineering , psychology , social psychology , politics , democracy , engineering
By drawing on the data and evidence related to a recent annulment, following the complaint of a small local SME, in an Italian administrative court of a large, limited-lots, tender published by the Italian largest Central Purchasing Body, we review the evidence for aggregation and bundling strategies of public procurement tenders in the light of the negative impact they generate on SME participation. We conclude by suggesting that an optimal strategy of centralization, which has several benefits, to survive requires limiting its bundling temptation.