Open AccessCronyism and Delaware Incorporation: An Examination on Excess Compensation
Author(s) -
Qian Xie
Publication year - 2013
Publication title -
accounting and finance research
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 1927-5994
pISSN - 1927-5986
DOI - 10.5430/afr.v2n4p60
Subject(s) - cronyism , compensation (psychology) , shareholder , executive compensation , business , finance , corporate governance , law , political science , psychology , social psychology , politics
This paper investigates whether Delaware incorporation relates to cronyism by examining excess director and CEO compensation. I find that excess director compensation is significantly and positively related to excess CEO compensation in both Delaware and non-Delaware firms. However, excess CEO compensation in non-Delaware firms is negatively associated with firm performance. The result indicates that cronyism does exist in non-Delaware firms but not in Delaware firms. Therefore, Delaware incorporation does not favor managers at the expense of shareholders.