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Managerial Incentives and Audit Fees: Evidence from the Mutual Fund Industry
Author(s) -
James R. Booth,
Lena Chua Booth,
Daniel Newton Deli
Publication year - 2012
Publication title -
accounting and finance research
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 1927-5994
pISSN - 1927-5986
DOI - 10.5430/afr.v1n1p76
Subject(s) - incentive , audit , business , mutual fund , compensation (psychology) , accounting , finance , fund administration , fund of funds , economics , microeconomics , psychology , psychoanalysis

We examine the relation between audit fees and managerial incentives in the mutual fund industry. Using proxies for managerial incentives based on fund organizational form, advisor compensation, and fund expenses, we find that audit fees are higher when managerial incentives are poor. Our results represent new evidence on the relation between audit fees and managerial incentives.

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