Open AccessA Fine-Grained Analysis of Director Dependence: Examining Board Composition In Detail
Author(s) -
Jonathan L. Johnson,
Alan E. Ellstrand,
Catherine M. Dalton,
Dan R. Dalton
Publication year - 1970
Publication title -
journal of business strategies
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 2162-6901
pISSN - 0887-2058
DOI - 10.54155/jbs.21.2.111-132
Subject(s) - operationalization , corporate governance , accounting , psychology , test (biology) , agency (philosophy) , principal–agent problem , construct (python library) , business , management , political science , econometrics , sociology , economics , computer science , epistemology , paleontology , social science , philosophy , biology , programming language
Past corporate governance research that has incorporated the concept of directors'dependence on the CEO has operationalized dependence in numerousways, often aggregating various indicators into a single construct. We extend thisresearch with an examination of individual indicators of director dependence bypartitioning director relationships into six categories. Relying on agency theoryin combination with other organizational theories, we test hypotheses about relationshipsbetween the different categories of director dependence and the presenceof antitakeover provisions and golden parachutes. We find that reciprocatedinterlocks are positively associated, and inside directors are negatively associated.with the presence ofantitakeover provisions. Implications for theory, method.and practice are discussed.