Open AccessStrategy Equilibrium in Stackelberg Model with Transmission Congestion in Electricity Market
Author(s) -
Kwang-Ho Lee
Publication year - 2014
Publication title -
journal of electrical engineering and technology/journal of electrical engineering and technology
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.226
H-Index - 27
eISSN - 2093-7423
pISSN - 1975-0102
DOI - 10.5370/jeet.2014.9.1.090
Subject(s) - stackelberg competition , cournot competition , nash equilibrium , economics , electricity market , microeconomics , electricity , engineering , electrical engineering
Nash Cournot Equilibrium (NCE) has been widely used in a competitive electricity market to analyze generation firms’ strategic production quantities. Congestion on a transmission network may lead to a mixed strategy NCE. Mixed strategy is complicated to understand, difficult to compute, and hard to implement in practical market. However, Stackelberg model based equilibrium does not have any mixed strategy, even under congestion in a transmission line. A guide to understanding mixed strategy equilibrium is given by analyzing a cycling phenomenon in the players’ best choices. This paper connects the concept of leader-follower in Stackelberg model with relations between generation firms on both sides of the congested line. From the viewpoint of social welfare, the surplus analysis is presented for comparison between the NCE and the Stackelberg equilibrium (SE).