Open AccessBARRIERS TO NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION IN THE EXPORT OF THE RUSSIAN FAST REACTORS WITH CLOSED NFC (USING EXAMPLE BREST-OD-300)
Author(s) -
N. V. Gorin,
Е. В. Кузнецов,
V. P. Kuchinov,
A. N. Chebeskov,
A. V. Moiseev,
V. V. Shidlovskiy,
A. V. Krivtsov
Publication year - 2022
Publication title -
vestnik nâc rk
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 1729-7885
pISSN - 1729-7516
DOI - 10.52676/1729-7885-2021-4-16-21
Subject(s) - nuclear weapon , nuclear power , nuclear material , nuclear engineering , explosive material , nuclear technology , nuclear fuel cycle , fuel cycle , business , international trade , environmental science , engineering , nuclear physics , physics , chemistry , organic chemistry
In the coming decades, it is possible to start exporting fast reactors with a closed nuclear fuel cycle to non-nuclear-weapon countries, which will require strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime and increasing the effectiveness of IAEA safeguards. This can be achieved both by creating technical barriers and by improving the system of accounting and control of nuclear materials and ensuring their reliable physical protection. Using the example of the BREST-OD-300 reactor under construction as part of a pilot demonstration power complex, the analysis of design and technological features that prevent or seriously hinder the switching of nuclear materials or the use of technologies by the importing State in violation of its international obligations to produce nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices has been carried out.