Vietnam and Philippines’ Hedging against China in the South China Sea: Economic and Security Perspectives

This article is based on the argument that despite competing for territorial claims and different military stands off, the competing states have shown considerable restraint and hedging behaviors against each other’s to not make the politics of the South China Sea on a point of no return. This assumption is correct in a way that on economic forums like Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), they have shown their consensus to resolve their disputes peacefully. But it seems wrong on the pretext that then why this economic interdependence has not provided the space to resolve their perennial territorial disputes in the South China Sea. To find out which assumption seems true, this article is based on the theoretical framework of the Strategic Hedging perspective. This study tries to find the answer to the research question of despite close economic interdependence and military stands offs, why regional states have failed to resolve the SCS dispute? China, the regional hegemon, claims the South China Sea (SCS) region as its core interest and provides the basis for its claims based on historical usage and part of the ancient Chinese dynasties. Vietnam has also shown inflexibility in its claim in the region overlapping with China and other competing states. Honai has also invoked international law to stop the Chinese territorial assertiveness in the region. The Philippines, one of the three important claimants of the SCS, has also tried to take help of the international court of arbitration and the support of global hegemon the US to extend its sovereignty in the disputed islands of the SCS. This article concludes with the findings that Vietnam and the Philippines are using constrain cum hedging to save their national interests from Beijing. Keywords: Politics, Hedging, South China Sea, Economy, Security, Spratly, Paracel