Open AccessCOGNITIVE BASIS OF FOCAL POINTS: EVOLUTION AND CORRELATED EQUILIBRIUM EMERGENCE
Author(s) -
Valerii Shevchenko
Publication year - 2021
Publication title -
logiko-filosofskie študii
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 2223-3954
pISSN - 2071-9183
DOI - 10.52119/lphs.2021.79.54.012
Subject(s) - relevance (law) , argument (complex analysis) , action (physics) , connection (principal bundle) , cognition , basis (linear algebra) , evolutionary game theory , computer science , epistemology , mathematical economics , coordination game , game theory , cognitive science , cognitive psychology , equilibrium selection , psychology , repeated game , mathematics , philosophy , political science , biochemistry , chemistry , physics , geometry , quantum mechanics , neuroscience , law
The paper sketches a way to connect cognitively realistic notion of relevance needed for social coordination and game-theoretic models of such coordination, in particular, that of correlated equilibrium. Such a connection would help to answer the question of how social coordination described in game theory is evolutionary and cognitively possible. The main argument put forward is to equate a signal’s relevance to its information quantity - the more relevant a signal is, the more it changes probabilities of action.