Open AccessWhy Luck Egalitarianism Fails in Condemning Oppression
Author(s) -
Cynthia A. Stark
Publication year - 2020
Publication title -
feminist philosophy quarterly
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
ISSN - 2371-2570
DOI - 10.5206/fpq/2020.4.8101
Subject(s) - oppression , egalitarianism , luck , doctrine , criticism , social psychology , law and economics , sociology , law , environmental ethics , psychology , epistemology , philosophy , political science , politics
Luck egalitarianism has been criticized for (1) condoning some cases of oppression and (2) condemning others for the wrong reason—namely, that the victims were not responsible for their oppression. Oppression is unjust, however, the criticism says, regardless of whether victims are responsible for it, simply because it is contrary to the equal moral standing of persons. I argue that four luck egalitarian responses to this critique are inadequate. Two address only the first part of the objection and do so in a way that risks making luck egalitarianism inconsistent. A third severely dilutes the luck egalitarian doctrine. A fourth manages to denounce some instances of oppression for the right reason, but at the same time permits other instances of oppression and condemns yet others for the wrong reason.