Open Access“Me Too”: Epistemic Injustice and the Struggle for Recognition
Author(s) -
Debra Jackson
Publication year - 2018
Publication title -
feminist philosophy quarterly
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
ISSN - 2371-2570
DOI - 10.5206/fpq/2018.4.6231
Subject(s) - injustice , testimonial , harassment , context (archaeology) , sociology , subject (documents) , epistemology , polyphony , social injustice , denial , psychology , social psychology , criminology , political science , psychoanalysis , philosophy , law , politics , history , computer science , pedagogy , archaeology , library science , advertising , business
Congdon (2017), Giladi (2018), and McConkey (2004) challenge feminist epistemologists and recognition theorists to come together to analyze epistemic injustice. I take up this challenge by highlighting the failure of recognition in cases of testimonial and hermeneutical injustice experienced by victims of sexual harassment and sexual assault. I offer the #MeToo movement as a case study to demonstrate how the process of mutual recognition makes visible and helps overcome the epistemic injustice suffered by victims of sexual harassment and sexual assault. I argue that in declaring “me too,” the epistemic subject emerges in the context of a polyphonic symphony of victims claiming their status as agents who are able to make sense of their own social experiences and able to convey their knowledge to others.