Open AccessTwo Dogmas of Moral Theory? Comments on Lisa Tessman’s Moral Failure
Author(s) -
Eva Feder Kittay
Publication year - 2016
Publication title -
feminist philosophy quarterly
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
ISSN - 2371-2570
DOI - 10.5206/fpq/2016.1.3
Subject(s) - normative ethics , moral disengagement , normative , misfortune , action (physics) , moral psychology , epistemology , action theory (sociology) , ethical theory , social cognitive theory of morality , sociology , moral responsibility , philosophy , linguistics , physics , narrative , quantum mechanics
In Moral Failure, Lisa Tessman argues against two principles of moral theory, that ought implies can and that normative theory must be action-guiding. Although Tessman provides a trenchant account of how we are thrust into the misfortune of moral failure, often by our very efforts to act morally, and although she shows, through a discussion well-informed by the latest theorizing in ethics, neuroethics, and psychology, how much more moral theory can do than provide action-guiding principles, I argue that the two theses of moral theory that she disputes remain indispensable for ethical theory.