Open AccessPSYCHOLOGICAL CONCEPTS IN COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE
Author(s) -
Marcelo Carvalho
Publication year - 2020
Publication title -
prometeus
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 2176-5960
pISSN - 1807-3042
DOI - 10.52052/issn.2176-5960.pro.v12i33.13808
Subject(s) - cognitive neuroscience , fallacy , hacker , psychology , perspective (graphical) , epistemology , cognitive science , attribution , cognition , reading (process) , argument (complex analysis) , relevance (law) , neurolaw , meaning (existential) , social neuroscience , philosophy , social cognition , neuroscience , social psychology , computer science , linguistics , biochemistry , chemistry , artificial intelligence , political science , law , operating system
The use of psychological concepts in cognitive neuroscience is heavily criticized by Bennett & Hacker's Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience. The central objection points to neuroscience's attribution to the brain of psychological concepts that are meaningful only when applied to the entire being. That is supposedly the case of “seeing,” “communicating,” and “reading.” Bennett & Hacker identify in such attributions what they call a mereological fallacy. The critical revision of Bennett & Hacker's argument is an opportunity to present the debate about philosophy and psychological neuroscience and outline a Wittgensteinian perspective about the meaning of psychological concepts, its interest, and its relevance to scientific research.