Television Violence and You

Television has become more and more restricted within the past few years.Rating systems and "family programming" have taken over the broadcastnetworks, relegating violent programming, often some of the most cuttingedge work in television, to pay channels. There are very few peoplewilling to stand up and say that viewers -- even young children -- shouldbe able to watch whatever they want, and that viewing acts of violence canactually result in more mature, balanced adults. Jib Fowles is one of those people. His book, The Case For TelevisionViolence, explores the long history of violent content in popular culture,and how its modern incarnation, television, fulfils the same function asepic tragedy and "penny dreadfuls" did -- the diverting of aggressivefeelings into the cathartic action of watching. Fowles points out theflaws in studies linking TV violence to actual violence (why, for example,has there been a sharp decline in violent crime in the U.S. during the1990s when, by all accounts, television violence has increased?), as wellas citing overlooked studies that show no correlation between viewing andperforming acts of violence. The book also demonstrates how efforts tocensor TV violence are not only ineffective, but can lead to the oppositeresult: an increase in exposure to violent viewing as audiences forsaketraditional broadcast programming for private programming through pay TVand videocassettes.The revised excerpt below describes one of the more heated topics ofdebate -- the V-Chip. Television Violence and YouAlthough the antiviolence fervor crested in the US in the first half ofthe 1990s, it also continued into the second half. As Sissela Bokcomments: "during the 1990s, much larger efforts by citizen advocacygroups, churches, professional organizations, public officials, and mediagroups have been launched to address the problems posed by media violence"(146). It continues as always. On the one side, the reformist position findsarticulation time and again; on the other side, the public's incessantdesire for violent entertainment is reluctantly (because there is noprestige or cachet to be had in it) serviced by television companies asthey compete against each other for profits. We can contrast these two forces in the following way: the first, theantitelevision violence campaign, is highly focussed in its presentation,calling for the curtailment of violent content, but this concerted efforthas underpinnings that are vague and various; the second force is highlydiffused on the surface (the public nowhere speaks pointedly in favor ofviolent content), but its underpinnings are highly concentrated andfunctional, pertinent to the management of disapproved emotions. To date, neither force has triumphed decisively. The antiviolenceadvocates can be gratified by the righteousness of their cause and senseof moral superiority, but violent content continues as a mainstay of themedium's offerings and in viewers' attention. Over the longer term,equilibrium has been the result. If the equilibrium were upset, however, unplanned consequences wouldresult. The attack on television violence is not simply unwarranted; itcarries the threat of unfortunate dangers should it succeed. In the US,television violence is a successful site for the siphoning off of unwantedemotions. The French critic Michel Mourlet explains: "violence is a majortheme in aesthetics. Violence is decompression: Arising out of a tensionbetween the individual and the world, it explodes as the tension reachesits pitch, like an abscess burning. It has to be gone through before therecan be any repose" (233). The loss or even diminishment of television violence would suggest thatsurplus psychic energy would have to find other outlets. What theseoutlets would be is open to question, but the possibility exists that someof them might be retrogressive, involving violence in more outright andvicious forms. It is in the nation's best interest not to curtail thesymbolic displays that come in the form of television violence. PolicyThe official curbing of television violence is not an idle or emptythreat. It has happened recently in Canada. In 1993, the Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission, the equivalent of theAustralian Broadcasting Authority or of the American FCC, banned any"gratuitous" violence, which was defined as violence not playing "anintegral role in developing the plot, character, or theme of the materialas a whole" (Scully 12). Violence of any sort cannot be broadcast before 9p.m. Totally forbidden are any programs promoting violence against women,minorities, or animals. Detailed codes regulate violence in children'sshows. In addition, the Canadian invention of the V-chip is to beimplemented, which would permit parents to block out programming thatexceeds preset levels for violence, sexuality, or strong language(DePalma). In the United States, the two houses of Congress have held 28 hearingssince 1954 on the topic of television violence (Cooper), but none has ledto the passage of regulatory legislation until the Telecommunications Actof 1996. According to the Act, "studies have shown that children exposedto violent video programming at a young age have a higher tendency forviolent and aggressive behavior later in life than children not soexposed, and that children exposed to violent video programming are proneto assume that acts of violence are acceptable behavior" (Section 551). It then requires that newly manufactured television sets must "beequipped with a feature designed to enable viewers to block display of allprograms with a common rating" (Telecommunications Act of 1996, section551). The V-chip, the only available "feature" to meet the requirements,will therefore be imported from Canada to the United States. Utilising arating system reluctantly and haltingly developed by the televisionindustry, parents on behalf of their children would be able to black outoffensive content. Censorship had passed down to the family level. Although the V-chip represents the first legislated regulation oftelevision violence in the US, that country experienced an earlier episodeof violence censorship whose outcome may be telling for the fate of thechip. This occurred in the aftermath of the 1972 Report to the SurgeonGeneral on Television and Social Behavior, which, in highly equivocallanguage, appeared to give some credence to the notion that violentcontent can activate violent behavior in some younger viewers. Pressurefrom influential congressmen and from the FCC and its chairman, RichardWiley, led the broadcasting industry in 1975 to institute what came to beknown as the Family Viewing Hour. Formulated as an amendment to the Television Code of the NationalAssociation of Broadcasters, the stipulation decreed that before 9:00 p.m."entertainment programming inappropriate for viewing by a general familyaudience should not be broadcast" (Cowan 113). The definition of"inappropriate programming" was left to the individual networks, but asthe 1975-1976 television season drew near, it became clear to a productioncompany in Los Angeles that the definitions would be strict. The producersof M*A*S*H (which aired at 8:30 p.m.) learned from the CBS censor assignedto them that three of their proposed programs -- dealing with venerealdisease, impotence, and adultery -- would not be allowed (Cowan 125). Theseries Rhoda could not discuss birth control (131) and the series Phylliswould have to cancel a show on virginity (136). Television writers andproducers began to rebel, and in late 1975 their Writers Guild brought alawsuit against the FCC and the networks with regard to the creativeimpositions of the Family Viewing Hour. Actor Carroll O'Connor (as quotedin Cowan 179) complained, "Congress has no right whatsoever to interferein the content of the medium", and writer Larry Gelbert voiced dismay (asquoted in Cowan 177): "situation comedies have become the theater ofideas, and those ideas have been very, very restricted". The judge whoheard the case in April and May of 1976 took until November to issue hisdecision, but when it emerged it was polished and clear: the FamilyViewing Hour was the result of "backroom bludgeoning" by the FCC and wasto be rescinded. According to the judge, "the existence of threats, andthe attempted securing of commitments coupled with the promise topublicize noncompliance ... constituted per se violations of the FirstAmendment" (Corn-Revere 201). The fate of the Family Viewing Hour may havebeen a sort of premoniton: The American Civil Liberties Union is currentlybringing a similar case against proponents of the V-chip -- a case thatmay produce similar results. Whether or not the V-chip will withstand judicial scrutiny, there areseveral problematic aspects to the device and any possible successors. Itsusage would appear to impinge on the providers of violent content, on theviewers of it, and indeed on the fundamental legal structure of the UnitedStates. To confront the first of these three problems, significant use of the V-chip by parents would measurably reduce the audience size for certainprogrammes containing symbolic violence. Little else could have greaterimpact on the American television system as it is currently constituted. Adecrease in audience numbers quickly translates into a decrease inadvertising revenues in an advertising system such as that of the UnitedStates. Advertisers may additionally shy away from a shunned programmebecause of its loss of popularity or because its lowered ratings haveclearly stamped it as violent. The decline in revenues would make theprogramme less valuable in the eyes of network executives and perhaps acandidate for cancellation. The Hollywood production company would quicklytake notice and begin tailoring its broadcast content to the newstandards. Blander or at least different fare would be certain to result.Broadcast networks may begin losing viewers to bolder content on lessfastidious cable networks and in particular to the channels that are notsupported and influenced by advertising. Thus, we might anticipate a shiftaway from the more traditional and responsible channels towards the lessso and away from advertising-supported channels to subscriber-supportedchannels. This shift would not transpire according to the traditionalgoverning mechanism of television -- audience preferences. Those to whomthe censored content had been destined would have played no role in itsneglect. Neglect would have transpired because of the artificialintercession of controls. The second area to be affected by the V-chip, should its implementationprove successful, is viewership, in particular younger viewers. Currently,young viewers have great license in most households to select the contentthey want to watch; this license would be greatly reduced by the V-chip,which can block out entire genres. Screening for certain levels ofviolence, the parent would eliminate most cartoons and all action-adventure shows, whether the child desires some of these or not. A NewYork Times reporter, interviewing a Canadian mother who had been an earlytester of a V-chip prototype, heard the mother's 12-year-old sonprotesting in the background, "we're not getting the V-chip back!" Themother explained to the reporter, "the kids didn't like the fact that theywere not in control any longer" (as quoted in DePalma C14) -- with goodreason. Children are losing the right to pick the content of which theyare in psychological need. The V-chip represents another weapon in thegenerational war -- a device that allows parents to eradicate thecompensational content of which children have learned to make enjoyableuse. The consequences of all this for the child and the family would beunpleasant. The chances that the V-chip will increase intergenerationalfriction are high. Not only will normal levels of tension and animosity bedenied their outlet via television fiction but also so will the newsuperheated levels. It is not a pleasant prospect. Third, the V-chip constitutes a strong challenge to traditional AmericanFirst Amendment rights of free speech and a free press. Stoutly defendedby post-World War II Supreme Courts, First Amendment rights can be voided"only in order to promote a compelling state interest, and then only ifthe government adopts the least restrictive means to further thatinterest" (Ballard 211). The few restrictions allowed concern such mattersas obscenity, libel, national security, and the sometimes conflictingright to a fair trial. According to legal scholar Ian Ballard, there is no"compelling state interest" involved in the matter of television violencebecause "the social science evidence used to justify the regulation oftelevised violence is subject to such strong methodological criticism thatthe evidence is insufficient to support massive regulatory assault on thetelevision entertainment industry" (185). Even if the goal of restrictingtelevision violence were acceptable, the V-chip is hardly "the leastrestrictive means" because it introduces a "chilling effect" on programmeproducers and broadcasters that "clearly infringes on fundamental FirstAmendment rights" (216). Moreover, states Ballard, "fear of a slipperyslope is not unfounded" (216). If television violence can be censored,supposedly because it poses a threat to social order, then what topicsmight be next? It would not be long before challenging themes such afeminism or multiculturalism were deemed unfit for the same reason. Taking all these matters into consideration, the best federal policyregarding television violence would be to have no policy -- to leave theextent of violent depictions completely up to the dictates of viewerpreferences, as expertly interpreted by the television industry. In this,I am in agreement with Ian Ballard, who finds that the best approach "isfor the government to do nothing at all about television violence" (218). Citation reference for this articleMLA style:Jib Fowles. "Television Violence and You." M/C: A Journal of Media andCulture 3.1 (2000). [your date of access] .Chicago style:Jib Fowles, "Television Violence and You," M/C: A Journal of Media andCulture 3, no. 1 (2000), ([your date of access]). APA style:Jib Fowles. (2000) Television Violence and You. M/C: A Journal of Mediaand Culture 3(1). ([your date of access]).