Open AccessLegal philosophy and the study of legal reasoning
Author(s) -
Torben Spaak
Publication year - 2021
Publication title -
anali pravnog fakulteta u beogradu
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 2406-2693
pISSN - 0003-2565
DOI - 10.51204/anali_pfbu_21405a
Subject(s) - epistemology , legal realism , empirical legal studies , rationality , legal formalism , philosophy of law , deductive reasoning , holism , relevance (law) , legal practice , legal research , order (exchange) , legal profession , law , philosophy , political science , black letter law , comparative law , private law , finance , economics
In this paper, I argue that legal philosophers ought to focus more on problems of legal reasoning. This is a field with many philosophically interesting questions to consider, but also, a field in which legal philosophers can contribute the most to the study and the practice of law. Neither legal practitioners nor legal scholars reason with the same care and precision as philosophers do. Against this background, I suggest that the following three types of questions regarding legal reasoning are especially worthy of serious consideration. The first is that of the relevance of the theory of reasons holism to legal reasoning. The second is the question of how to analyze (first-order) legal statements in a way that does not undermine the rationality of legal reasoning. And the third is the question of whether legal arguments are to be understood as deductive arguments, inductive arguments, or both, and if so how.