Open AccessContent, object, and phenomenal character
Author(s) -
Marco Aurélio Sousa Alves
Publication year - 2012
Publication title -
principia
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.176
H-Index - 4
eISSN - 1808-1525
pISSN - 1414-4247
DOI - 10.5007/1808-1711.2012v16n3p417
Subject(s) - content (measure theory) , adjudication , object (grammar) , epistemology , intuition , grasp , perception , psychology , philosophy , computer science , law , linguistics , mathematics , political science , mathematical analysis , programming language
The view that perceptual experience has representational content, or the content view, has recently been criticized by the defenders of the so-called object view. Part of the dispute, I claim here, is based on a lack of grasp of the notion of content. There is, however, a core of substantial disagreement. Once the substantial core is revealed, I aim to: (1) reject the arguments raised against the content view by Campbell (2002), Travis (2004), and Brewer (2006); (2) criticize Brewer’s (2006, 2007, 2008, 2011) attempts to defend the object view; (3) refine Pautz’ (2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011) arguments against the object view, which mainly resort to the fact that it cannot account for the grounding role of hallucinatory experiences; (4) and finally adjudicate in favor of the content view and against the overestimation of the naïve intuition