Open AccessThe limits of the neuroscience of moral responsibility
Author(s) -
Daniel de Vasconcelos Costa
Publication year - 2021
Publication title -
ethic@
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
ISSN - 1677-2954
DOI - 10.5007/1677-2954.2021.e79816
Subject(s) - moral responsibility , action (physics) , free will , moral disengagement , attribution , argument (complex analysis) , epistemology , psychology , moral psychology , social responsibility , collective responsibility , social psychology , sociology , philosophy , political science , law , biochemistry , physics , chemistry , quantum mechanics
The findings of the neuroscientist Benjamin Libet are among the most discussed in moral philosophy. They present a clear challenge to the notion of intentional action as a consciously chosen action. According to them, the awareness of the decision to act by the subjects of his studies came only after the moment of preparedness of the action in our brains, called “readiness potential”. Many, including Libet, saw these results as an evidence that we do not have free will nor moral responsibility. The aim of this article is to criticize the claim that moral responsibility would be in danger because of the Libet’s findings. First, the concept of free will as intentional action will be explained in order to understand how the notion of being conscious in deciding when and how to act is relevant. Then, the findings from Libet’s experiments and the argument of how they could be a challenge to the notions of free will and of moral responsibility are presented. At the end, it will be argued that the notion of moral responsibility involves more than psychological capacities, but, foremost, the attribution of social roles in a moral community.