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Health Care Insurance and Moral Hazard
Author(s) -
Hong Mao,
Jin Wang
Publication year - 2021
Publication title -
randwick international of social science journal/randwick international of social science journal
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 2722-5674
pISSN - 2722-5666
DOI - 10.47175/rissj.v2i3.268
Subject(s) - copayment , moral hazard , morale hazard , actuarial science , health care , health insurance , social insurance , business , self insurance , economics , microeconomics , economic growth , market economy , incentive
In this article, we discuss how moral hazard affects health care insurance, the social benefit and the harmfulness of moral hazard in health care insurance. We also discuss the relationship between copayment rate and decease risks and indicate that it is necessary to reduce copayment ratio for serious decease in social health care insurance in order to generate social gain. Finally, we carry out sensitivity analysis to illustrate the effect of the change of important parameters on optimal copayment rate.

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