z-logo
open-access-imgOpen Access
Longino's Concept of Values in Science
Author(s) -
Miroslav Vacura
Publication year - 2021
Publication title -
teorie vědy
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 1804-6347
pISSN - 1210-0250
DOI - 10.46938/tv.2021.504
Subject(s) - epistemology , positivism , consistency (knowledge bases) , value (mathematics) , sociology , positive economics , social science , management science , philosophy , mathematics , economics , statistics , geometry
While classical neo-positivists reject any role for traditionally understood values in science, Kuhn identifies five specific values as criteria for assessing a scientific theory; this approach has been further developed by several other authors. This paper focuses on Helen Longino, who presents a significant contemporary critique of Kuhn’s concept. The most controversial aspect of Longino’s position is arguably her claim that the criterion of empirical adequacy is the least defensible basis for assessing theories. The de-emphasizing of the importance of external consistency as a value and the introduction of socio-political considerations into the processes of an assessment of scientific theories are also considered problematic issues. I provide arguments against Longino’s conception, identify some of its problems, and argue for refusal of her approach.

The content you want is available to Zendy users.

Already have an account? Click here to sign in.
Having issues? You can contact us here