
Inercialita v kontextu Leibnizovy korespondence s Clarkem
Author(s) -
Kateřina Lochmanová
Publication year - 2020
Publication title -
teorie vědy
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.101
H-Index - 6
eISSN - 1804-6347
pISSN - 1210-0250
DOI - 10.46938/tv.2020.482
Subject(s) - opposition (politics) , inertial frame of reference , motion (physics) , theory of relativity , absolute time and space , classical mechanics , philosophy , physics , newton's laws of motion , absolute monarchy , epistemology , law , politics , political science
This study deals with a controversy between Leibniz and Clarke concerning the relativity of space. Although substantivalism, i.e. an approach treating space as a substance, is to be indicated as the main target of Leibniz’s attack, it has usually been replaced by Newtonian absolutism instead, as a proper opposition to Leibniz’s relationalism. However, such absolutism has not been defined ontologically, but dynamically, as if the difference between their conceptions consisted of a different approach to the inertiallity of motion. However, this would mean that while Leibniz intended to reduce all motion to an inertial one, Newton reduced it to a noninertial one instead, or that only one of them acknowledged the existence of noninertial motion at all. Nevertheless, none of them actually denied the existence of noninertial motion, and although all motion indeed seemed noninertial to Newton, Leibniz never responded to such a challenge in the course of their correspondence.