Open AccessNewtonova metodologie a kritika mechanického materialismu
Author(s) -
R. Zavadil
Publication year - 2020
Publication title -
teorie vědy
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.101
H-Index - 6
eISSN - 1804-6347
pISSN - 1210-0250
DOI - 10.46938/tv.2020.461
Subject(s) - demonstrative , epistemology , criticism , premise , philosophy , universality (dynamical systems) , materialism , mathematical proof , value (mathematics) , theoretical physics , calculus (dental) , mathematics , physics , law , linguistics , quantum mechanics , medicine , geometry , statistics , dentistry , political science
This article will introduce Isaac Newton’s fundamental methodological concepts applied for a solution concerning a question of gravity in his Principia Mathematica. The method of deduction of propositions from phenomena can be described as demonstrative induction. The main aim is to show that this method proposed by Newton explicitly contains a criticism of hypothetico-deductive methodology as an inadequate approach to the study of nature. As opposed to hypothetico-deductive method, demonstrative induction is capable of producing theories with much richer empirical and epistemological value. Delimitation against hypothetically deduced theories is closely connected with criticism of mechanical materialism, most notably in a form proposed by René Descartes. Consequently, it has led Newton to not only reject the universality of mechanical premise but also to certain level of immunization against all competitive hypothetically based theories.