Open AccessSecurity Analysis of BLAKE2’s Modes of Operation
Author(s) -
Atul Luykx,
Bart Mennink,
Samuel Neves
Publication year - 2016
Publication title -
iacr transaction on symmetric cryptology
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.715
H-Index - 10
ISSN - 2519-173X
DOI - 10.46586/tosc.v2016.i1.158-176
Subject(s) - hash function , computer science , cryptanalysis , security analysis , successor cardinal , cryptographic hash function , computer security , function (biology) , skein , focus (optics) , ideal (ethics) , carry (investment) , cryptography , theoretical computer science , arithmetic , mathematics , philosophy , business , physics , epistemology , mathematical analysis , finance , evolutionary biology , optics , biology
BLAKE2 is a hash function introduced at ACNS 2013, which has been adopted in many constructions and applications. It is a successor to the SHA-3 finalist BLAKE, which received a significant amount of security analysis. Nevertheless, BLAKE2 introduces sufficient changes so that not all results from BLAKE carry over, meaning new analysis is necessary. To date, all known cryptanalysis done on BLAKE2 has focused on its underlying building blocks, with little focus placed on understanding BLAKE2’s generic security. We prove that BLAKE2’s compression function is indifferentiable from a random function in a weakly ideal cipher model, which was not the case for BLAKE. This implies that there are no generic attacks against any of the modes that BLAKE2 uses.