Open AccessConsolidating Security Notions in Hardware Masking
Author(s) -
Lauren De Meyer,
Begül Bilgin,
Oscar Reparaz
Publication year - 2019
Publication title -
iacr transactions on cryptographic hardware and embedded systems
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
ISSN - 2569-2925
DOI - 10.46586/tches.v2019.i3.119-147
Subject(s) - composability , computer science , implementation , glitch , masking (illustration) , theoretical computer science , variety (cybernetics) , order (exchange) , computer engineering , distributed computing , computer security , programming language , artificial intelligence , telecommunications , art , finance , detector , economics , visual arts
In this paper, we revisit the security conditions of masked hardware implementations. We describe a new, succinct, information-theoretic condition called d-glitch immunity which is both necessary and sufficient for security in the presence of glitches. We show that this single condition includes, but is not limited to, previous security notions such as those used in higher-order threshold implementations and in abstractions using ideal gates. As opposed to these previously known necessary conditions, our new condition is also sufficient. On the other hand, it excludes avoidable notions such as uniformity. We also treat the notion of (strong) noninterference from an information-theoretic point-of-view in order to unify the different security concepts and pave the way to the verification of composability in the presence of glitches. We conclude the paper by demonstrating how the condition can be used as an efficient and highly generic flaw detection mechanism for a variety of functions and schemes based on different operations.