Open AccessA Bio-Inspired Reward-Based Message Forwarding For Vehicular Social Network
Author(s) -
Aklilu Mandefro Messele
Publication year - 2020
Publication title -
international research journal of science and technology
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
ISSN - 2707-3955
DOI - 10.46378/irjst.2020.010206
Subject(s) - computer science , computer network , network packet , node (physics) , selfishness , packet forwarding , incentive , broadcasting (networking) , payment , computer security , engineering , world wide web , political science , law , economics , microeconomics , structural engineering
The Ants capability of working together and their way of message transmissionmakes us inspired especially their cooperation for their common goal anddropping down pheromones which used as a trail for themselves and for others.We would use Ants broadcasting method for drivers‟ cooperation and messageforwarding. Therefore if there were any driver who couldn‟t broadcast anyemergency message related to car accident like Ants done to locate the foodsource, could be considered as a selfish node and couldn‟t be rewarded ascooperatives do. The previous vehicle to vehicle communication or messageforwarding schemes that was tried to motivate cooperative drivers used incentivemethods in which it is not motivating all participant nodes and some of themused punishment methods. These types of methods are not effective to stimulateselfish drivers. We conducted the research using embedded traffic simulation inwhich it includes mobility and network simulation capabilities merged togetherand served as multi-functional software. From the tools falling into the embeddedcategory is National Chiao Tung University network simulator (NCTUns) whichprovides a full range of network stack simulation tools. Watchdog was ourselfishness detection method, in which the RSU controls whether nodes arecooperative or not because the (Road Side Unit) RSU knows where the nodeswere located and in which path they are drive and what messages theybroadcasted. The rewarding model we used is paying per packet. The paymentprinciple is for each successfully transmitted unit-sized packet, each of Nintermediate nodes should receive λ credits, whereas the service provider (SP)would pay λ ∗ N in total. The proposed solution was evaluated by the threeperformance metrics which are dropped packets, selfishness detection methodand delivery ratio. Based on our experiments result the number of accidentincreased as the number of total nodes increased in the same simulation area. Asthe number of nodes participated on the area increases the probability of havingan accident increases and the probability of stimulating selfish nodes increasedusing the same incentive method and amount because there is a probability ofaccident commit increases and the rewarding and acknowledgement messagesalso increases in which it can stimulate the selfish nodes.