Open AccessGame Model of Retailers Leading Closed-Loop Supply Chain under Different Guarantee Modes
Author(s) -
Mei-xiang Wu,
Chuang Shi,
Qiang Sun
Publication year - 2020
Publication title -
international journal emerging technology and advanced engineering
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
ISSN - 2250-2459
DOI - 10.46338/ijetae1020_13
Subject(s) - business , order (exchange) , supply chain , mode (computer interface) , game theory , closed loop , selection (genetic algorithm) , sequential game , industrial organization , environmental economics , microeconomics , computer science , marketing , economics , finance , control engineering , artificial intelligence , engineering , operating system
—In order to study the retailer-led differentiated guarantee behavior of CLSC's remanufactured products, assuming that demand is influenced by differentiated guarantee period of remanufactured products and consumers' willingness to pay, three game models of unguaranteed, manufacturer's guarantee and retailer's guarantee are constructed respectively to discuss the influence of guarantee mode selection and guarantee cost parameters on each member's decision. The results show that differentiated guarantees for remanufactured products are beneficial to extending the guarantee period, reducing the price of remanufactured products, improving CLSC members and overall profits. When consumers are less sensitive to differentiated guarantee for remanufactured products, CLSC decision in each mode has little to do with guarantee cost parameters and guarantor selection. When consumers are more sensitive, the advantages of each guarantee mode are significantly different, and manufacturer guarantee is the common choice of both parties. Finally, an example is given to further verify the conclusion.