Open AccessMatching algorithm of the auctions on Ebay
Author(s) -
Nguyen Van Phuong
Publication year - 2020
Publication title -
khoa học
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
ISSN - 1859-3453
DOI - 10.46223/hcmcoujs.econ.en.1.1.113.2011
Subject(s) - unobservable , matching (statistics) , common value auction , computer science , set (abstract data type) , point (geometry) , auction algorithm , forward auction , object (grammar) , construct (python library) , generalized second price auction , microeconomics , advertising , business , revenue equivalence , auction theory , mathematics , artificial intelligence , economics , programming language , statistics , geometry , econometrics
This paper explores eBay auction properties that match buyers and sellers and generates millions of sales every month. eBay’s auction is now a well known mechanism designed to make buyers and sellers feel comfortable doing business without meeting each other. In a theoretical point of view, the current matching algorithm has not solved the online auction problems because the main conditions of agents’ preferences do not satisfy when bidders are unobservable and a set of bidders is not identified. Therefore, we construct a new simplified model of matching with a given object for sale to form a seller-bidder pair to overcome the online auction issues. Specially, our model may extend for the matching mechanism of the job market.