z-logo
open-access-imgOpen Access
Critique of Nkrumah’s Philosophical Materialism
Author(s) -
Emmanuel Ifeanyi Ani
Publication year - 2016
Publication title -
africa thought and practice/thought and practice
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 2076-7714
pISSN - 0251-043X
DOI - 10.4314/tp.v7i1.2
Subject(s) - materialism , metaphysics , epistemology , philosophy , idealism , dialectical materialism , kwame , dialectic , doctrine , sociology , theology , anthropology
Kwame Nkrumah invokes the doctrine of emergentism in the hope of reconciling theism - a tenacious part of the African worldview - with materialism. However, in this article I seek to show that this reconciliation is not only ultimately unsuccessful, but is actually impossible. Towards this end, I identify weaknesses in what I call the six argumentative pillars of Nkrumah’s theory of emergentism (which he calls “philosophical materialism”), namely, his arguments regarding the origin of the cosmic material, the primary reality of matter, idealism, categorial convertibility, dialectic change, and the self-motion of matter. The article should provide not only alternative perspectives to Nkrumah’s metaphysics, but also highlight some broader metaphysical implications for both strong and weak emergentism. Key WordsPhilosophical materialism, consciencism, emergentism, cosmic material, categorial conversion, dialectical change, self motion of matter

The content you want is available to Zendy users.

Already have an account? Click here to sign in.
Having issues? You can contact us here