Open AccessScientific revolution, incommensurability and truth in theories: objection to Kuhn’s perspective
Author(s) -
Cardinal Ihejirika,
Christian C. Emedolu
Publication year - 2018
Publication title -
afrrev stech
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 2227-5444
pISSN - 2225-8612
DOI - 10.4314/stech.v7i1.5
Subject(s) - scientific realism , epistemology , perspective (graphical) , realism , scientific theory , scientific revolution , scientific progress , philosophy , normal science , sociology , computer science , artificial intelligence
This is to revaluate the truth-content of scientific theory in the event of scientific revolution. In this paper, we argued that the radical views on incommensurability offered, especially, by Thomas S. Kuhn (shared by Paul Feyerabend, and others) do not actually undermine either the realist or cumulative stature of science. The core of our discussion is, ultimately, to provide a clearer and broader picture of the general characteristics of scientific revolution or theory change. In doing this, the paper pinpoints the audacity behind this change and the nature of truth undergirding any emergent or overthrown scientific theory. The paper has some rebounding echoes of the realist and cumulative features of science while addressing the issue of the real character of theory change. Following some unique interpretations of scientific revolution, truth in science could still be redeemed in the face of theory change and Kuhnian Incommensurability Thesis. To this effect, the hermeneutical approach is considered most suitable in this paper.Keywords: Scientific-Revolution; Incommensurability; cumulative structure; Truth; Realism