Sklenitev rimsko-gotske mirovne pogodbe leta 382

Seeking to call attention to the possibilities raised by the available sources but so far left unexamined, the author indicates some possible interpretations, which, however, can be proved with no more certainty than the prevailing view. Assuming that they might be correct, the course of events which led to the peace treaty of 382 may be summarised as follows. After the crushing defeat suffered by the Roman army in the Battle of Adrianople on August 9th, 378, Emperor Gratian attempted to stem the hostile rampages of the Goths, Huns, and Alans by offering them a truce in the same year. Since he was unsuccessful, the appointment of Theodosius as the new Emperor in the eastern part of the Roman Empire implied that the latter, at the head of a reorganised eastern army, would bear the main burden and responsibility in the Gothic war. In keeping with this plan, Illyricum, previously annexed to the West in its entirety, was divided into the western and eastern parts. The eastern part with the dioceses of Dacia and Macedonia, perceived as more prone to invasions by the Goths and their associates, the Huns and Alans, was annexed to Theodosius’ East, while the western part remained subject to the western administrative structures. If the campaigns of Theodosius’ army proved successful, the West was presumably no longer expected to come under attack, so the troops stationed there were, in the unlikely event of an attack, meant to stop the enemy’s progress only if Theodosius’ army should fail to carry out its basic plan. Since the year 379 was marked by Roman successes, owing to the disorganised warfare of the enemy troops, the attack of Alatheus and Saphrax’ group on Pannonia in the spring of 380 came as a surprise, probably no longer seriously contemplated. The surprise may have been still enhanced if the members of the triethnic group did not invade Pannonia from the south, across the Sava River, as might have been expected from their sojourn in Thrace, but first successfully attacked Athanaric, who was staying with his Thervingi in the Carpathian area, and then invaded Pannonia from the east, across the Danube. At the same time Fritigern’s Thervingi invaded Macedonia and Thessaly, where the very first clash with the Roman side revealed that Theodosius’ new army was not yet equal to a serious conflict. Meanwhile, the Roman troops stationed in Pannonia succeeded in checking the enemy’s incursion despite the initial surprise, and it is quite possible that the Roman troops under the command of Bauto and Arbogast, sent by Gratian at Theodosius’ request to relieve the Eastern Emperor’s unsuccessful army, drove out into Thrace not only Fritigern’s Thervingi but also the Greuthungi, Huns, and Alans of Alatheus and Saphrax’ group. In this case Gratian would have needed no peace treaty with the latter in 380, as the members of the triethnic group would have already withdrawn from Pannonia after the end of that year’s military operations. After 380, there are no reports of renewed military clashes but rather of diplomatic attempts at solving the ensuing difficulties. In the January of 381, Theodosius received at Constantinople Athanaric, the former leader of the Thervingi, who sought refuge with the Romans after having been banished by his own people – presumably with the aid of Fritigern’s Thervingi and the members of Alatheus and Saphrax’ triethnic group – as a Roman collaborator. The agreement with Athanaric and his Thervingi was, with Gratian’s consent, made by Emperor Theodosius. According to the extant sources, it was again Theodosius alone who, as long as twenty months later, concluded a treaty with the rest of the Thervingi, and probably with the Greuthungi, Huns, and Alans of the triethnic group. In contrast to the former agreement, Gratian’s role in this treaty is more difficult to define, for in 382 Theodosius no longer needed his fellow ruler’s help – an important factor in the cooling of the relations between the two Emperors to the extent that it would be vain to expect a harmonised collaboration. However, since all contracts were formally signed in the name of all current Emperors, the crucial issue may be, not whether Gratian’s men were present at the signing of the peace treaty or not, but whether the peace efforts might have been, once again, at least partly influenced by Gratian’s consent in the background. This question will perhaps never be answered by the extant sources with certainty. Even assuming that Thrace alone was the area which the Goths, Huns, and Alans were entitled to settle by the contract of 382, it remains unclear whether this particular territory was chosen because, in keeping with the original agreement between the two Emperors, the West wanted no unnecessary dealings with the Goths even after the end of the war, or because Theodosius was unable, in the absence of the western representatives, to offer for settlement an area which did not belong to him at the time