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Asymmetric Enforcement of Cooperation in a Social Dilemma
Author(s) -
Nikiforakis Nikos,
Normann Hans-Theo,
Wallace Brian
Publication year - 2010
Publication title -
southern economic journal
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.762
H-Index - 58
eISSN - 2325-8012
pISSN - 0038-4038
DOI - 10.4284/sej.2010.76.3.638
Subject(s) - punishment (psychology) , institution , enforcement , social dilemma , dilemma , earnings , public good , microeconomics , economics , social psychology , business , public economics , psychology , political science , law , accounting , philosophy , epistemology
We use a public‐good experiment to analyze behavior in a decentralized asymmetric punishment institution. The institution is asymmetric in the sense that players differ in the effectiveness of their punishment. At the aggregate level, we observe remarkable similarities between outcomes in asymmetric and symmetric punishment institutions. Controlling for the average punishment effectiveness of the institutions, we find that asymmetric punishment institutions are as effective in fostering cooperation and are as efficient as symmetric institutions. At the individual level, we find that players with higher punishment effectiveness contribute similar amounts to the public account but have higher earnings and punish more than their weak counterparts.