Premium
Help and Factionalism in Politics and Organizations
Author(s) -
Chan William,
Man Priscilla
Publication year - 2012
Publication title -
southern economic journal
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.762
H-Index - 58
eISSN - 2325-8012
pISSN - 0038-4038
DOI - 10.4284/0038-4038-79.1.144
Subject(s) - contest , incentive , tournament , dilemma , politics , order (exchange) , rank (graph theory) , face (sociological concept) , turnout , control (management) , political science , distribution (mathematics) , public relations , political economy , business , economics , microeconomics , sociology , voting , management , law , epistemology , social science , mathematical analysis , philosophy , mathematics , finance , combinatorics
Whether in electoral politics or promotions within organizations, players often face the dilemma of whether to enter the contest or to assist other candidates. This article analyzes incentives in a rank‐order tournament when the winner has control over resources that he can distribute to his supporters. Some players may then be encouraged to help others in exchange for paybacks, resulting in factionalism, with leaders and supporters sorted by ability. The number and the size of factions depend on the reward structure of the contest and the distribution of abilities. These implications are corroborated by data on U.S. gubernatorial primary elections.