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Private Goods, Public Goods, and Common Pools with Homo Reciprocans
Author(s) -
Cox James C.
Publication year - 2012
Publication title -
southern economic journal
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.762
H-Index - 58
eISSN - 2325-8012
pISSN - 0038-4038
DOI - 10.4284/0038-4038-79.1.1
Subject(s) - public good , appropriation , reciprocity (cultural anthropology) , inefficiency , microeconomics , public goods game , stackelberg competition , social dilemma , private good , economics , common good , caste , public economics , political science , social psychology , psychology , linguistics , philosophy , politics , law
Familiar inefficiencies arise with competing interests over private goods in Stackelberg and investment games. Private good experiments reveal whether reciprocity enhances cooperative outcomes. Familiar social dilemmas arise with voluntary provision of public goods and voluntary appropriation from common pools. Experiments with pairs of payoff‐equivalent provision and appropriation games reveal whether reciprocity is more or less effective in ameliorating under‐provision or over‐appropriation. Experiments with asymmetric provision and appropriation games also yield insight into the effects of the Indian caste system on inefficiency from social dilemmas. Experiments with three types of games, with a private good, public good or common pool, provide diagnostic tests of the homo reciprocans model.