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Tacit Collusion in Price‐Setting Oligopoly: A Puzzle Redux
Author(s) -
Van Essen Matt,
Hankins William B.
Publication year - 2013
Publication title -
southern economic journal
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.762
H-Index - 58
eISSN - 2325-8012
pISSN - 0038-4038
DOI - 10.4284/0038-4038-2011.157
Subject(s) - tacit collusion , collusion , oligopoly , duopoly , microeconomics , economics , redux , convergence (economics) , stability (learning theory) , mathematical economics , industrial organization , cournot competition , computer science , macroeconomics , aerospace engineering , machine learning , engineering
We study tacit collusion in price‐setting duopoly games with strategic complements and substitutes. While this problem has been considered by several studies, this article sheds new light on the comparison by focusing on the relationship between dynamic stability of equilibrium and tacit collusion. We find when controlling for the absolute slope of the reaction functions, there are no robust differences in either the convergence properties or tacit collusion between complements and substitutes treatments.