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A Statistical Analysis of Games with No Certain Nash Equilibrium Make Many Results Doubtful
Author(s) -
Galiya Klinkova,
Michael Grabinski
Publication year - 2022
Publication title -
applied mathematics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 2152-7393
pISSN - 2152-7385
DOI - 10.4236/am.2022.132010
Subject(s) - nash equilibrium , epsilon equilibrium , mathematical economics , trembling hand perfect equilibrium , equilibrium selection , symmetric equilibrium , best response , correlated equilibrium , risk dominance , distribution (mathematics) , mathematics , game theory , repeated game , mathematical analysis

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