Open AccessMultimedia Service Discrimination Based on Fair Resource Allocation Using Bargaining Solutions
Author(s) -
Shin KwangSup,
Jung JaeYoon,
Suh Doug Young,
Kang SukHo
Publication year - 2012
Publication title -
etri journal
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.295
H-Index - 46
eISSN - 2233-7326
pISSN - 1225-6463
DOI - 10.4218/etrij.12.0111.0435
Subject(s) - stackelberg competition , computer science , service provider , profit (economics) , quality of service , service delivery framework , resource allocation , service (business) , service level objective , game theory , computer network , operations research , service design , microeconomics , business , engineering , economics , marketing
We deal with a resource allocation problem for multimedia service discrimination in wireless networks. We assume that a service provider allocates network resources to users who can choose and access one of the discriminated services. To express the rational service selection of users, the utility function of users is devised to reflect both service quality and cost. Regarding the utility function of a service provider, total profit and efficiency of resource usage have been considered. The proposed service discrimination framework is composed of two game models. An outer model is a repeated Stackelberg game between a service provider and a user group, while an inner model is a service selection game among users, which is solved by adopting the Kalai‐Smorodinsky bargaining solution. Through simulation experiments, we compare the proposed framework with existing resource allocation methods according to user cost sensitivity. The proposed framework performed better than existing frameworks in terms of total profit and fairness.