Open AccessDifferential Side Channel Analysis Attacks on FPGA Implementations of ARIA
Author(s) -
Kim ChangKyun,
Schläffer Martin,
Moon SangJae
Publication year - 2008
Publication title -
etri journal
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.295
H-Index - 46
eISSN - 2233-7326
pISSN - 1225-6463
DOI - 10.4218/etrij.08.0107.0167
Subject(s) - side channel attack , block cipher , power analysis , field programmable gate array , computer science , embedded system , channel (broadcasting) , countermeasure , implementation , differential (mechanical device) , computer hardware , cryptography , engineering , computer security , computer network , programming language , aerospace engineering
In this paper, we first investigate the side channel analysis attack resistance of various FPGA hardware implementations of the ARIA block cipher. The analysis is performed on an FPGA test board dedicated to side channel attacks. Our results show that an unprotected implementation of ARIA allows one to recover the secret key with a low number of power or electromagnetic measurements. We also present a masking countermeasure and analyze its second‐order side channel resistance by using various suitable preprocessing functions. Our experimental results clearly confirm that second‐order differential side channel analysis attacks also remain a practical threat for masked hardware implementations of ARIA.