
LA LOGICA È EMPIRICA?
Author(s) -
Maria Paola Sforza Fogliani
Publication year - 1970
Publication title -
incontri di studio
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 2384-9878
pISSN - 2279-5251
DOI - 10.4081/incontri.2017.288
Subject(s) - argument (complex analysis) , epistemology , distributive property , philosophy , set (abstract data type) , reflexive pronoun , classical logic , centrality , mathematical economics , computer science , mathematics , linguistics , pure mathematics , biochemistry , chemistry , combinatorics , programming language
We owe to Hilary Putnam, among many other things, one of the most interesting revision of classical logic ever proposed; according to the author – or at least according to some of his temporal parts – we should abandon the distributive law in light of some quantum mechanics’ results. After having presented Putnam’s ideas (§1), and having set them within the philosophy of logic’s framework (§2), I will discuss one of the main arguments ever presented against the possibility of modifying logic on empirical bases, namely what Putnam himself has labeled ‘the centrality argument’ (§3). I will maintain that if this argument is correct then Putnam’s proposal – other than because of the criticisms that can be leveled at it from the point of view of the physical theories – fails for purely philosophical and logical reasons.