Open AccessContra intuições
Author(s) -
Giovanni Rolla
Publication year - 2021
Publication title -
filosofia unisinos
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.114
H-Index - 4
eISSN - 1984-8234
pISSN - 1519-5023
DOI - 10.4013/fsu.2021.221.03
Subject(s) - epistemology , sketch , naturalism , philosophy , pragmatism , criticism , mainstream , formal epistemology , counterexample , computer science , social epistemology , mathematics , art , literature , theology , algorithm , discrete mathematics
This paper intends to offer a critical evaluation of the role played by intuitions in the mainstream methodology in traditional analytic epistemology. The criticism directed to what I call methodology of evaluation by intuitions shows that epistemologists often idealize the reliability of intuitions when assessing a theory against potential counterexamples, ignoring that the disposition to answer intuitively to a case of concept attribution is bounded to the familiar dimension in which the relevant conceptual competence emerges. Thus, the reliability of intuitions does not necessarily extend to far-fetched cases. Given that the assessment by our intuitions is not sufficient to decide for or against an epistemological theory, I offer a sketch for a pragmatic and naturalized conception of theoretical decision-making in epistemology.Key-words: Intuitions, Analytic epistemology, Conceptual abilities, Naturalism, Pragmatism.