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Moral Hazard in Health Insurance
Author(s) -
Michel Grig,
Jeremiah Hurley,
David Feeny,
G. Emmanuel Guindon,
Christina Hackett
Publication year - 2018
Publication title -
oeconomia/œconomia
Language(s) - Uncategorized
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 2269-8450
pISSN - 2113-5207
DOI - 10.4000/oeconomia.3470
Subject(s) - moral hazard , morale hazard , health care , actuarial science , conceptualization , group insurance , self insurance , work (physics) , health insurance , hazard , consumption (sociology) , business , value (mathematics) , public economics , economics , sociology , economic growth , microeconomics , social science , mechanical engineering , chemistry , engineering , organic chemistry , artificial intelligence , machine learning , computer science , incentive

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