Open AccessTrouble on the Horizon for Presentism
Author(s) -
Sam Baron,
Baptiste Le Bihan
Publication year - 2023
Publication title -
philosophers' imprint
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.419
H-Index - 18
ISSN - 1533-628X
DOI - 10.3998/phimp.823
Subject(s) - presentism , event horizon , metaphysics , epistemology , argument (complex analysis) , theoretical physics , event (particle physics) , physics , philosophy , quantum mechanics , chemistry , biochemistry
Surface presentism is the combination of a general relativistic physics with a presentist metaphysics. In this paper, we provide an argument against this combination based on black holes. The problem focuses on the notion of an event horizon. We argue that the present locations of event horizons are ontologically dependent on future black hole regions, and that this dependence is incompatible with presentism. We consider five responses to the problem available to the surface presentist, and argue that none succeed. Surface presentism thus faces the prospect of empirical refutation based on the evidence available for the existence of black holes.