Open AccessStrategy‐proof voting for multiple public goods
Author(s) -
Reffgen Alexander,
Svensson LarsGunnar
Publication year - 2012
Publication title -
theoretical economics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 4.404
H-Index - 32
eISSN - 1555-7561
pISSN - 1933-6837
DOI - 10.3982/te909
Subject(s) - voting , social choice theory , separable space , set (abstract data type) , preference , mathematical economics , product (mathematics) , finite set , computer science , mathematics , microeconomics , economics , mathematical analysis , geometry , politics , political science , law , programming language
In a voting model where the set of feasible alternatives is a subset of a product set A = A 1 ×⋯× A m of m finite categories, we characterize the set of all strategy‐proof social choice functions for three different types of preference domains over A , namely for the domains of additive, completely separable, and weakly separable preferences over A .