Strategy‐proof voting for multiple public goods | Zendy

Reffgen Alexander | Zendy; Svensson LarsGunnar | Zendy

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Strategy‐proof voting for multiple public goods

Author(s) -

Reffgen Alexander,

Svensson LarsGunnar

Publication year - 2012

Publication title -

theoretical economics

Language(s) - English

Resource type - Journals

SCImago Journal Rank - 4.404

H-Index - 32

eISSN - 1555-7561

pISSN - 1933-6837

DOI - 10.3982/te909

Subject(s) - voting , social choice theory , separable space , set (abstract data type) , preference , mathematical economics , product (mathematics) , finite set , computer science , mathematics , microeconomics , economics , mathematical analysis , geometry , politics , political science , law , programming language

In a voting model where the set of feasible alternatives is a subset of a product set A = A 1 ×⋯× A m of m finite categories, we characterize the set of all strategy‐proof social choice functions for three different types of preference domains over A , namely for the domains of additive, completely separable, and weakly separable preferences over A .

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