Open Accessvon Neumann–Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets in two‐sided matching
Author(s) -
Mauleon Ana,
Vannetelbosch Vincent J.,
Vergote Wouter
Publication year - 2011
Publication title -
theoretical economics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 4.404
H-Index - 32
eISSN - 1555-7561
pISSN - 1933-6837
DOI - 10.3982/te527
Subject(s) - matching (statistics) , von neumann architecture , mathematical economics , von neumann–morgenstern utility theorem , computer science , mathematics , expected utility hypothesis , pure mathematics , statistics
We adopt the notion of von Neumann–Morgenstern (vNM) farsightedly stable sets to determine which matchings are possibly stable when agents are farsighted in one‐to‐one matching problems. We provide the characterization of vNM farsightedly stable sets: a set of matchings is a vNM farsightedly stable set if and only if it is a singleton subset of the core. Thus, contrary to the vNM (myopically) stable sets (Ehlers 2007), vNM farsightedly stable sets cannot include matchings that are not in the core. Moreover, we show that our main result is robust to many‐to‐one matching problems with substitutable preferences: a set of matchings is a vNM farsightedly stable set if and only if it is a singleton set and its element is in the strong core.